Detecting Smart Glasses: The Newest Insider Threat

Wireless Intrusion Detection Systems (WIDS) are evolving beyond Wi-Fi to include Bluetooth and other radio frequencies — and smart glasses are the reason the gap suddenly matters.

Dr. Brett Walkenhorst, CTO at Bastille, walks through why camera- and microphone-equipped eyewear has become indistinguishable from ordinary glasses, why the legacy WIDS most organizations already own will never see it, and what full-spectrum wireless detection has to do instead. The session closes with an extended Q&A covering trading floors, data halls, medically necessary devices, and whether cameras or guards can catch what RF can.

Video Summary

Over 7 million smart glasses were sold in 2025, and they no longer look like technology. They record audio and video, sync to a phone over Bluetooth, and push data to the cloud over cellular or Wi-Fi — often from inside facilities where that data is not supposed to travel. The U.S. Air Force banned them earlier this year, DEF CON banned them outright, and users are painting over and drilling out the recording LED that is supposed to warn the room.

The one thing a wearer cannot undo is the transmission itself. Legacy WIDS, built to keep intruders off a Wi-Fi network, misses it: it watches 802.11, largely ignores Bluetooth, and lacks the fidelity to tell one device from another. Full-spectrum wireless detection — 100 MHz to 7 GHz, Wi-Fi 6E and 7, Bluetooth Classic and BLE, cellular, Zigbee and IoT — plus passive monitoring, metadata analysis, allow-listing, and one-to-three-meter indoor localization turns a detection into an actionable alert someone can walk to.

This is not theoretical. One Bastille customer, a typical corporate office, sees roughly five smart glasses events per day. At DEF CON — where the devices were banned — a detector alerted about half a dozen times during a single one-hour presentation.

Key Takeaways

• Smart glasses have become visually indistinguishable from ordinary eyewear, and over 7 million pairs sold in 2025 means they now blend into everyday environments
• The recording LED is an unreliable control — users paint over it, disable it, or drill it out — but the RF emissions cannot be suppressed without making the device useless
• Legacy WIDS protects a Wi-Fi network from intrusion; it does not see the Bluetooth sync between glasses and phone, or the cellular path used to exfiltrate the recording
• Full-spectrum wireless detection covers 100 MHz to 7 GHz, including Wi-Fi 6E and Wi-Fi 7, Bluetooth Classic and BLE, cellular, Zigbee, and IoT protocols
• Three questions to ask of any detection system: does it see paired as well as advertising Bluetooth devices, does it localize accurately, and does it support whitelisting
• Detection without location is not actionable — there is no legal mechanism for blocking a transmission, so remediation depends on finding the device, ideally within one to three meters
• Federal drivers are already in place: the SecDef memo on continuous electronic device detection in SCIFs and SAPFs, DoDI 8420.01 continuous WLAN scanning with location sensing, CNSS controls, and ICD 705
• Monitoring in secure federal spaces must be passive — a detection system cannot add its own transmissions to the airspace
• Periodic bug sweeps leave gaps; the wireless environment is dynamic and devices come and go between sweeps, so coverage has to be continuous
• One Bastille customer in a standard corporate office averages about five smart glasses detections per day
• Meta and its Ray-Ban partnership dominate the market, but knockoff models built on shared frameworks carry the added risk of data going to servers overseas
• Glasses are one signature class among many — wearables, smart watches, hotspots, Flipper Zero-style tools, malicious cables and dongles, and covert bugs all share the same wireless tell
• Action plan: audit what your current WIDS can actually see, write a PED policy that covers wearables, baseline your airspace, then move to continuous monitoring with logging and audit trails

Featured Speakers

Transcript

Welcome and Introductions

Justin: Thank you for joining our webinar today on detecting smart glasses, the newest insider threat. My name is Justin Fry, CMO at Bastille. Our speaker today is Dr. Brett Walkenhorst. Brett is our CTO and the former director of the Software Defined Radio Lab at Georgia Tech, and works closely with our government and enterprise customers.

During the course of the event today we will have a number of opportunities to answer questions. Please do use the Q&A interface at the bottom of the Zoom interface. If you should have any technical questions, please use the chat button to let me know and we’ll do our best to sort those out at the time. As always, a recording of the webinar will be made available later this week. Thank you to everyone for joining today, and everyone who sent in questions ahead of the event. And now, Brett, over to you.

Why Smart Glasses Are Different

Brett: Thank you, Justin, and thanks to everyone for joining us today. Today’s topic is very pertinent to the world we’re living in. Smart glasses represent an interesting new type of device that is making life more difficult for those who are concerned about surveillance threats in all kinds of environments.

Smart glasses are extremely efficient when it comes to capturing information. They have embedded cameras and microphones. And what turns out to be the biggest issue with these devices is that they have largely become indistinguishable from ordinary eyewear. They’re also doing quite well in the market — over 7 million smart glasses were sold in 2025. There are a lot of them out there and they’re starting to blend in with society, so they’re not as obvious to the casual observer as they used to be. Now we have very capable devices that can reach the cloud and exfiltrate audio and video data from all kinds of environments, whether personal, corporate, or government facilities.

That has prompted backlash from organizations and personnel tasked with keeping information secure. The U.S. Air Force, for example, banned smart glasses earlier this year. That’s not terribly surprising — a lot of military and government installations are very concerned about the exfiltration of audio and video data. What’s interesting is the back and forth recently in the news and online. Various platforms are highlighting countermeasures to mitigate the effects of smart glasses, and then there are counter-countermeasures being employed. People are trying to disable the recording light, the LED on these glasses that indicates recording is taking place. Maybe they paint over it. Maybe they even drill it out to defeat that indicator.

All of this is concerning for a lot of reasons. But there is one thing about detecting smart glasses that a wearer could never undo. The fact that they transmit information is what makes them useful for audio and video exfiltration in the first place — and that transmission is visible to systems that look for wireless emissions.

Where Legacy WIDS Falls Short

Brett: These systems are sometimes called WIDS, for wireless intrusion detection system, and that’s a bit of a misnomer given what I’ve just described. WIDS is basically an attempt by Wi-Fi systems to ensure they’re protected against intrusion attempts — devices attempting to infiltrate a network. There are monitoring solutions available through access point providers that detect certain activities touching their own networks: Evil Twin, rogue access points, deauth attacks, those kinds of things. These systems can identify that something is happening, tell you about it, and maybe even act automatically. That’s a fairly narrow perspective, but it’s a good starting point for having visibility into the Wi-Fi.

Unfortunately, smart glasses will slip right by that kind of visibility. Smart glasses record video and audio — it could be in a secure facility, it could be anywhere — and then they sync to a smartphone or similar device over Bluetooth. That phone can be used to exfiltrate the data from the user’s pocket, and it will go to the cloud over cellular most likely, though it may go over Wi-Fi. Or it may happen offline: it gets recorded, and the offload happens off-site. Regardless, there’s a syncing process that happens over Bluetooth.

A typical WIDS doesn’t see this. WIDS is about “don’t penetrate my network.” It doesn’t really pay attention to Bluetooth for the most part. Some WIDS will look at it a little, but even then the fidelity of what they capture isn’t sufficient for identifying a pair of smart glasses. And the glasses aren’t using the Wi-Fi of the WIDS system itself to exfiltrate — they’re either using cellular, or doing a store-and-forward process where they reach a known Wi-Fi network later and offload. Legacy WIDS just sees the 802.11. Some can see a bit of Bluetooth, generally as heat maps of power levels, but they can’t discriminate individual devices and they aren’t analyzing the metadata.

What Full-Spectrum Detection Requires

Brett: What we really want is what you might call a full-spectrum WIDS: wireless detection, not just intrusion detection. We want localization, and we want analysis of metadata so we can make sense of what’s happening in the wireless domain. Part of that is asset identification, which you probably want anyway. But when it comes to defending against surveillance devices like smart glasses, you need full spectrum to see all of the wireless emissions and make sense of them.

Legacy WIDS may help you prevent a network attack on a network you’re trying to protect. But to defend against smart glasses and lots of other threats — wearables, phones, hotspots, other covert devices — you need to see the Wi-Fi, Bluetooth Classic as well as BLE, the cellular, and the IoT protocols. Any device leaking RF emissions, you’ll be able to see. Anything using the RF spectrum to get data from a secure facility out to something else, you’ll have visibility with a full-spectrum system — and you can localize the threat so you know where it is and can go do something about it.

Federal Mandates and Compliance

Brett: There’s been quite a bit of movement in the federal space to mandate against the use of electronic devices, and to ensure systems are in place to bring visibility and adjudication to that mandate. A memo came out of the Secretary of Defense’s office a couple of years back mandating continuous electronic device detection capabilities in all DoD SCIFs and SAPFs. Around that same time we had 8420.01, mandating continuous scanning for all wireless LAN activity — Wi-Fi — with location sensing to find and mitigate devices. Legacy WIDS doesn’t actually cover that; you need something that isn’t just looking at your own network to prevent intrusion, but at all devices, both authorized and unauthorized.

There are a couple of other controls for national security systems that ensure similar things, and then ICD 705, specific to SCIF and SAPF facilities, which requires certain physical and technical standards including the prohibition of unauthorized devices in classified spaces. The federal space has been looking at this for a long time. A lot of it isn’t new, but some of it is newer in trying to ensure that systems like full-spectrum WIDS are put in place.

Three Questions Before You Check the Box

Brett: The mandate is becoming more clear, but a compliance checkbox, while tempting, is often not sufficient. If you’re going to check the box, make sure you’re really making security more robust. There are three things to think about.

First, are we able to see all Bluetooth devices robustly? Many devices out there scan for advertising packets, or maybe just inquiry packets. Devices that aren’t in a pairing state or aren’t advertising actively — maybe they’ve already been paired and are actively connected — will be missed. There are very simple ways to check for devices, but you will miss a lot of activity, and we can’t be missing things or we have a gap in our security.

Second is location. It’s easy enough to detect a device, but locating it accurately is much more difficult — and without location we don’t have an actionable alert. When you’re dealing with wireless emissions there’s no legal mechanism for preventing the transmission of data when you see something concerning. The bar is pretty high for making sure you’re not getting in the way of valid communications; the FCC will be all over you. So identifying the location is critical in order to remediate.

Third is whitelisting. You can see all kinds of devices, but that doesn’t mean they’re all of equal concern. This is especially relevant to the federal mandate, where you may have medically necessary devices allowed in specific spaces even though devices generally are not. You have to be able to whitelist those, or you’ll get false alarms all over the place and end up not using the detection capability at all because it isn’t actionable.

What Better Looks Like

Brett: You want full-spectrum coverage: 100 megahertz to 7 gigahertz, which covers Wi-Fi 6E — the 6 gigahertz band — and Wi-Fi 7. You want Bluetooth, BLE, cellular, Zigbee, and all the IoT protocols. For the federal space you need passive monitoring. You can’t be cluttering the airspace with additional junk, because you’re not allowed to bring transmitting devices into secure spaces. That’s the whole point: you need a system that can monitor transmissions, not create more of them. It’s simply against policy, so it has to be passive.

You have to detect all the Bluetooth packets in any state, paired or unpaired, and provide localization with reasonable accuracy. One to three meters is a good target, so you can see by room and even by desk where a device is coming from. And you need continuous coverage. There’s a whole industry that does really good work scanning and sweeping for bugs. That’s valid — but if that’s all you’re doing, you’re missing a lot of data in between those sweeps. Continuous monitoring is critical because the wireless environment is dynamic and things come and go all the time. Smart glasses specifically come in and out of your facility without an easy visual check, so you need continuous RF coverage to identify them and prevent them from taking valuable data out. And you need management capabilities — allow lists, logging, audit trails — to stay compliant for reporting purposes.

Here at Bastille, this is what we do. We close the gap in that visibility problem with software-defined radio sensors covering all the frequencies and protocols. We have a localization algorithm that works very well indoors and handles multipath well, so you can go directly to where the event is happening rather than hunting around and hoping you stumble on it before the threat leaves. And it maps to the mandates I talked about, with full logging for audit purposes.

Real-World Detections: A Corporate Office and DEF CON

Brett: This is not just theory. There are millions of these devices out there and they’re being used routinely, as we see in chatter online — and in data I’ve come across in recent weeks and months. The Bastille system has been deployed at a customer facility, a typical corporate office setting, and we have routinely been identifying about five smart glasses events per day. In some sense that’s good news, because it could be a lot more. But these glasses are coming in and out of a facility where the customer is very concerned about the security of their data. They need the ability to identify that something forbidden by policy isn’t being used against them to extract data that shouldn’t be extracted. How many more facilities have this threat coming into them every single day?

Another anecdote: I was at DEF CON last week, and DEF CON specifically banned the use of smart glasses at the entire conference. Don’t do it, don’t take recordings — there are privacy issues and legal implications, so they banned them outright. That’s interesting coming from an organization big on threat research and hacking; to make that claim, you have to think they know a few things. What was interesting is that in spite of the ban, human nature being what it is, I attended a demo where a device intended to detect smart glasses was alerting — probably half a dozen times during a one-hour presentation. That was not a canned demo. Those were glasses coming and going, close enough to be detected.

The key thing often missing with those simple devices is that they don’t localize. You can get detections at an event like DEF CON, but you don’t actually know who the problem is or where it’s coming from. Smart glasses really are an interesting signature class. They aren’t that difficult to identify — you just have to be looking in the right space and frequency, at the right protocol, decoding the right metadata and analyzing it. They can be identified by both their Wi-Fi and their Bluetooth emissions, so we can see them as soon as they come into a monitored facility. They’ll flag immediately.

Beyond Glasses: The Broader Wireless Threat Landscape

Brett: Glasses are not the whole threat. There’s a lot more going on in the wireless airspace: wearables, smart watches, fitness bands, all kinds of cellular devices, and devices specifically designed for attacking. They’re marketed as pen testing capabilities, but of course bad actors can use them too. The Flipper Zero is a cute little example, but there are lots of cables, dongles, fake hotspots, and other tools designed for penetrating networks or extracting information. And like smart glasses, there are things designed for covert capture and transmission — wireless bugs, embedded devices — that you can hide in plain sight.

The threat landscape is broad, but all of these devices have one thing in common: they all transmit wireless packets. If you’re looking for those, you’ll begin to see a whole other world. It’s like putting on a pair of polarized glasses when you’re fishing — it cuts through the water much more clearly. It’s a new paradigm where you see the world in a different way, and all of these threats start to come out of the woodwork so you can do something about them.

Action Plan

Brett: As far as action plans go, consider your wireless detection scope. Can your WIDS, if you have one, detect unpaired and paired Bluetooth devices? If it can’t, you’re lacking a lot of visibility — you have a Wi-Fi monitor ensuring your network isn’t being intruded upon, which is a good starting point, but you don’t have robust wireless detection.

Consider your policy, depending on who you are and where you operate. A PED policy for wearables — things that can sneak in — should address smart glasses, smart watches, hearables, and smart rings. The federal government has provisions for approved medical devices, and commercial entities should probably accommodate that too. But make sure you’ve excluded devices that pose a real threat to your data. Then ensure you’re mapping to the various mandates and providing an adjudication capability for your policy. Run a baseline for your airspace, run a survey to understand what’s in your facility, and implement continuous monitoring so that you’re continuously protected.

Q&A: Knockoff Models and OUIs

Justin: Thank you, Brett — very good presentation. We have a number of questions from people in commercial and federal organizations. First question: do you have a list of generics or knockoffs and their accompanying OUIs, organizationally unique identifiers?

Brett: We do. Let me start by saying that Meta is the 300-pound gorilla in the room. Meta has partnered with Ray-Ban, they have a number of models out there, and they sell the majority of smart glasses on the market. There are a lot of other knockoff manufacturers, and many of them rely on a similar framework, which indicates some connection between them — maybe they just package an existing framework and sell it under different names.

I would caution that in addition to the concerns about Meta glasses — privacy and legal concerns — there’s an extra concern with some of these knockoff brands that the data is probably not as protected as it is in the Meta ecosystem. It’s probably going to a server in China somewhere, because that’s where a lot of these knockoffs come from. So there’s an extra layer of concern: even if people aren’t using them inappropriately, whatever they’re collecting may also be available to folks who shouldn’t have access to it.

Q&A: What Smart Glasses Do and Who Makes Them

Justin: Someone asks how you detect smart glasses and what their specific capabilities are — who makes them, what’s their main purpose and threat? We haven’t done a review of all the types of smart glasses at this time. As Brett said, the main player is Meta, but there are a number of knockoffs and similar products coming along. Brett, any comments on this one?

Brett: Let me start with the main purpose and threat. The objective purpose of smart glasses is to enable people to use computing, in particular AI, to help them process information they’re exposed to. Audio and video recording capabilities are part of that, and then you have integrations with AI and LLMs. That seems like a reasonable thing. Then there are privacy and legal concerns, and the threat is about their ability to extract information from places they shouldn’t be able to.

They’re supposed to give you a physical indicator that something is happening — a recording LED — and there are people who have reportedly tried to disable that so the indicator doesn’t help someone sitting across the table from them. This is an interesting dialogue going on in society right now about how much of these technologies we want to put into people’s hands, counterbalanced against how much of a threat that poses, not only to privacy but to data, systems, and conversations that would be considered sensitive, proprietary, even classified. How do we balance those two competing interests?

Q&A: Idle Devices on a Trading Floor

Justin: A different type of question, from a commercial concern: our biggest risk is an unauthorized insider on a trading floor during earnings preparation. Can you detect a phone or wearable that’s recording but sitting idle in someone’s pocket?

Brett: Good question. Whether it’s in the pocket or on the head — the pocket would be even more covert, because whatever they’ve done with the LED, it’s even less visible to someone. You’re not going to get video, but you’ll get the audio, which can be just as valuable to an attacker. So the answer is yes, we can absolutely see them, because they are communicating wirelessly.

Those wireless emissions don’t go directly from one pocket to another. They go everywhere — the signals radiate in all directions all the time, and they propagate very well. If you have a sensor close enough to hear it, and close enough could be tens of meters or even longer depending on how they implement their connectivity, you can hear it. You can alert on it, because there’s metadata inside the packets being sent that can uniquely identify it as a specific kind of smart glass. So yes, you can absolutely see them, and I’d highly recommend looking into those kinds of solutions if you have a use case like the one described.

Q&A: Approved Consumer Devices and Alert Fatigue

Justin: A similar question from a commercial perspective: half our employees wear smart watches and earbuds. How do we avoid burying the security team in alerts on approved consumer devices?

Brett: There is a possibility for whitelisting, and I also want to be honest that it can be a challenge. What we do at Bastille is identify the unique ID, like a MAC address, that allows us to whitelist. But as you probably know, MAC addresses can roll, and with Bluetooth that’s very common. So we either need to facilitate fixing the MAC address on the approved target device, or we employ analysis that resolves those MAC rotations — and Bastille is actively working on those technologies.

What you want to do is whitelist, and we have those capabilities, but there are use cases where it becomes challenging, so there’s constant work to make that more robust. In general it works fairly well. When you see an alert, investigate how likely it is to be legitimate, and have a process you work through to mitigate the risk.

Q&A: Glasses Recording to Onboard Storage

Justin: An interesting question that will come up in different environments: a senior executive walks into a room wearing glasses that look exactly like normal glasses. He never connects them to Wi-Fi and just records to onboard storage. Is there anything you can do to detect that? Are the glasses emitting all the time?

Brett: That sounds like a challenging problem, because there’s no emission — but it turns out the glasses are always sending Bluetooth signals. I’m less sure on the Wi-Fi; I don’t know if that’s configurable by the user. All of these models can connect over Wi-Fi and Bluetooth, and some instantiate an AP-like capability so a phone can connect as a client, while others act as clients seeking to connect to APs. I believe the Wi-Fi is also quite chatty, but I’m very confident the Bluetooth is always talking. So you can still see them even if they aren’t attempting to connect to Wi-Fi at that point in time.

If all you have is a WIDS, this use case would be highly problematic, because they would have to be trying to connect to your Wi-Fi for you to see them. That’s not the case with a full-spectrum capability. You have to be looking at the whole thing, and they are chatty enough that you will see them.

Q&A: Can Cameras and Guards Tell the Difference?

Justin: Someone here has obviously invested a lot of money in security infrastructure, physical and cameras. Their question: our screening relies on guards spotting security devices and surveillance cameras around our building. Smart glasses might defeat that by design. Can security cameras tell the difference between a visitor’s ordinary prescription glasses and a pair with cameras and mics?

Brett: I don’t have a way of doing that, and based on my understanding of signal processing and how you might process a video feed, I think that would be highly problematic. There might be some small indicator, like the LED, if the video could see it and you had AI operating on that. I wouldn’t use LLMs to analyze it — they’re not optimized for that — but there might be an AI you could train. The problem is it’s tricky, it’s difficult, and I’m pretty sure it wouldn’t work very well.

This highlights exactly what motivated looking at the wireless environment in the first place. You can’t really see them reliably with another modality. The most robust way to see smart glasses is to look at the spectrum, because they’re constantly chatting — whether they have someone on the other end to talk to or not, they’re still talking.

That same modality in the question is one of the things that motivated us to look at this months ago, because we were seeing so many examples in the news of people caught and prosecuted for extracting classified information from secure government facilities simply by taking pictures of screens with their smartphones. Those were identified by video feed, by physical inspection, by someone noticing a phone where it shouldn’t be. Smart glasses don’t have that same visibility from an optics perspective. You really need the RF — that’s critical.

Q&A: Isolating a Signal in an RF-Saturated Data Hall

Justin: A question from someone in the data center world: in a data hall saturated with RF, can you actually isolate the Bluetooth signal from a pair of smart glasses among thousands of other emitters, and localize it to a specific aisle or the person standing there?

Brett: Actually, you can — that’s a beautiful question, thanks for setting me up to brag about it. There’s so much going on. But if you have a system that can parse the world in frequency and time, just like a device that would listen to a Bluetooth signal in order to pair and communicate with it, a broadband spectrum sensor can do the same kind of thing. You slice the world in frequency and time, listen to all those packets, and extract the metadata from the headers, because there’s orthogonalization going on in both dimensions. Unless there’s a packet collision, in which case no one hears it, you can absolutely pull that out of everything else going on over the airwaves, extract the metadata, and analyze it to identify a pair of smart glasses. So the answer is an unequivocal yes.

Localization was part of the question too. Absolutely — we take the packets we’ve isolated, run them through our localization algorithm, and get pretty good accuracy. It depends on the environment, to be honest. In environments with a lot of metal we’ll be on the higher end of our accuracy range, more like three meters than one. In a typical office environment you’ll often have detections on the order of a meter. So you can get very specific and very accurate with it.

Q&A: Approved Use by Vision-Impaired Employees

Justin: An interesting question we’ve come across with other types of medical devices: we’re starting to allow vision-impaired people to use smart glasses to help navigate the building and perform their roles. How do we know who’s wearing what and where they are — and whether it’s the right people, or someone abusing a policy that allows certain people to use smart glasses but not others?

Brett: This gets into a question of data correlation: can you identify that a specific person is associated with a specific set of emissions to ensure they’re legitimate? That begs for a combination of sensing modalities. RF is probably not going to be sufficient by itself. You might have another indicator of a device a specific person uses — I see this Wi-Fi device along with this other Bluetooth device, so I know that Wi-Fi device belongs to them — and you might do some correlation that way. More likely you’ll correlate with another system, whether an RFID system or a video camera system, to identify whether the right person is with the right signal. You can absolutely bring all those data feeds into one place; we do integrations like that between Bastille and other security systems all the time, including RFID and video camera feeds.

The one other thing I’d caution is that you need appropriate policies to deal with whatever legal issues might be associated with identifying people as they move through your facility. It’s one thing to identify wireless emissions; it’s another to associate them with an actual person. I’m not a legal expert and I’m not going to give you advice on that, but make sure you’ve done the right things there so everything’s on the up and up.

Q&A: When the Recording LED Has Been Tampered With

Justin: Smart glasses often have a tiny LED that’s supposed to indicate recording, but there are aftermarket mods that disable it. Since we can’t always rely on a visual tell, how do we know if it’s active — in someone’s bag, on someone’s head? How do we really know what’s going on?

Brett: I think about all the different ways you could look at that, and I keep coming back to the RF. There isn’t anything else. If the LED has been tampered with, there’s no visual indicator. There’s really nothing about that device that would indicate its behavior except its wireless emissions. Identifying that it’s actually recording might be a little tricky — you might be able to tell from certain data points in the wireless packets that there’s a continuous stream of data transfer that would indicate it’s likely recording. I don’t think there’s a specific indicator in the packet itself you could extract if you’re not part of that network. But I think you’ll know something is happening by the RF. Without the LED, there really isn’t anything else.

Q&A: Can Someone Tell a Bastille System Is Active?

Justin: With AR glasses and smart glasses, someone asked: is there any way that someone using smart glasses can detect that a system like Bastille is active?

Brett: Interesting question. The short answer is no, simply because Bastille isn’t transmitting anything. I’m not going to say the answer couldn’t possibly be yes — I’m just struggling to think how they would identify it. If you have a monitoring system that is purely passive, there’s nothing a radio could do that would tell them anything, unless they somehow had access to something on the wire. If there were some way to use their own network and it had a connection to the Bastille system — which sometimes they do and sometimes they don’t, sometimes the system is purely standalone — I don’t know how you would know, except by having prior information or being able to physically see something. But we often hide our sensors up in the plenum space, so you don’t even see them. Just using the smart glasses alone, I can’t think of any way they would be able to identify that Bastille is in the area monitoring.

Closing

Justin: Super, Brett — thank you so much for your time today. Thank you to all the attendees and people who registered for the event, and everyone who filled out the polls; that’s very helpful to us. We’ll send out a recording of this later in the week. To learn more about Bastille, please visit bastille.net.

Brett: Thank you, Justin. Thanks, everyone.