History of Wireless and RF Threats – Part 2

This webinar from Bastille focused on the timeline of wireless and RF threats, examining key milestones and notable events in cybersecurity history. The discussion was led by Justin Fry (CMO), Rodney Alto (CIA advisor), and Brett Walkenhorst (CTO), who explored how wireless threats have evolved from simple surveillance devices to sophisticated nation-state attacks. They emphasized that wireless signals are ubiquitous, invisible, and vulnerable to exploitation, with tens of billions of devices creating an ever-expanding attack surface that travels at the speed of light and penetrates physical security barriers.

The presenters detailed several critical case studies including the NSO Group’s Pegasus spyware that can turn smartphones into surveillance devices, the “flying pineapple” attacks using drones to deploy rogue access points, the Salt Typhoon infiltration of US telecommunications infrastructure by Chinese hackers, and the “nearest neighbor” attack methodology where attackers compromise nearby devices to launch wireless attacks remotely. They concluded by discussing how AI is accelerating both offensive and defensive capabilities in the wireless threat landscape, enabling 24/7 automated vulnerability scanning and attack development while also providing new tools for defenders to analyze RF spectrum data and identify emerging threats.

For a similar discussion watch Part 1 of this webinar.

Topics Covered

• Evolution of wireless and RF threats from World War II era to present day
• NSO Group’s Pegasus spyware and smartphone surveillance capabilities
• Innovative attack methods (flying pineapples, nearest neighbor attacks)
• Salt Typhoon telecommunications infrastructure compromise
• AI’s role in accelerating both cyber attacks and defense mechanisms

Intended Audience

• National security professionals and government agencies
• Corporate security teams and IT administrators
• Telecommunications and critical infrastructure operators
• Cybersecurity researchers and threat intelligence analysts
• Organizations with secure facilities requiring RF spectrum monitoring

Speakers

Dr. Brett Walkenhorst has over 20 years of experience as a technology leader in RF systems and signal processing. Prior to Bastille, he led and executed R&D efforts at Lucent Bell Labs, GTRI, NSI-MI Technologies, Silvus Technologies, and Raytheon Technologies. He is a senior member of IEEE and has served as the Chair of the Atlanta Chapter of the IEEE Communications Society.

Rodney Alto is a retired CIA Director of the Global Infrastructure Office with over 35 years of federal strategy and security experience spanning Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, Africa, Europe, and conflict zones. Currently serving as CEO of Bear River Consulting LLC and Federal Strategy and Security at Forward Networks, Inc., Rodney specializes in helping organizations navigate government mission drivers and risk factors that influence federal decisions. He holds executive education credentials from Harvard Kennedy School, University of Maryland, and University of Michigan Ross School of Business.

Full Transcript

Thank you so much for your interest in Bastille. This focuses on the timeline of wireless and RF threats, key milestones and notable events. This is part of a multi-part series. My name is Justin Fry. I’m the CMO here at Bastille. Today we are lucky enough to be joined by Rodney Alto, one of our advisors and a former senior executive at the CIA, and also Brett Walkenhorst, our CTO.

Some housekeeping issues while people join the event today. Questions: We’ll have a Q&A session at the end of the webinar. You can ask questions at any time using the Q&A button in the middle of the Zoom interface.

Polls: During the webinar we may hold some polls and we very much appreciate your participation.

If you have any technical issues with the webinar, please use the chat button to let us know—we’ll do our best to resolve those issues. As always, a recording of the event will be made available later.

Now over to Rodney and Brett who can introduce themselves before going to the core of the presentation. Thank you so much.

Justin, thank you. I’m happy to be here today. My name is Rodney Alto. For those who don’t know me, I retired from the Central Intelligence Agency in 2022 as an executive officer there after thirty-five-plus years.

After departing CIA, I have served as an advisor to a multitude of companies focused in the national security space and in the technology space as a whole. Happy to be here, and I will turn it over to Brett for an introduction.

Yeah. Thanks, Rodney. Thanks, Justin.

Brett Walkenhorst. I’m the CTO at Bastille. Background in electrical engineering, signal processing, RF systems, in charge of wireless threat research, as well as some other R&D efforts and product development. I’m interested in this topic because I think historically we haven’t paid a lot of attention to how wireless threats affect the overall ecosystem. And we’ve done a lot of research at Bastille both on current threats as well as historical. So this gives us a chance to kind of go back in time and review some history and look at trends to see where things are going.

So with that, I think we’ll just jump right in.

As just sort of a high-level overview, we have this graphic that shows some highlights of some interesting historical items. We’ll be hitting on several of these as we go through the timeline, but just know we’ve tried to sample this in a way that makes sense that allows us to tell a story, but there’s way more going on than we can possibly talk about in a short webinar like this.

So hopefully this gets you an interesting sample.

To set the stage, I want to talk about trends in general and the wireless problem at a high level as well.

One of the big issues with wireless is that it’s everywhere. It’s all around us. There are tens of billions of devices that utilize one or more wireless protocols throughout the world today, and those numbers continue to grow.

And the signals that they emit are likewise everywhere because the devices are everywhere, but also because the signals propagate and penetrate physical objects readily, which should come as no surprise if you’re able to get a cell phone call while you’re inside of a building.

Then you know that those waves that are propagating through the air are able to penetrate the walls of that building.

These waves travel at the speed of light and they just sail right through all of our physical obstructions, physical security mechanisms. So one of the issues here is the ubiquity of the wireless devices and their signals that are all around.

And we cannot see them. These signals that are traveling at the speed of light are the same basic phenomenon that we see in sunlight.

The only problem is unlike sunlight, which occupies the visible light spectrum that we can actually see, which occupies a very narrow band of the electromagnetic spectrum—these signals that our wireless devices use, we can’t see them.

So we require some kind of instrumentation to bring those signals into view so that we can make sense out of what’s happening. So their invisibility is part of the problem and their vulnerability to exploitation is another part.

There’s several thousand CVEs that have been published to date related to wireless technologies.

And you can see the trend here in this chart is one of exponential growth, in part because over time we realize that this is more of a problem, we pay more attention to it, but in part also because as these systems and the protocols that they utilize to support them as they grow in complexity to support ever-increasing complex use cases, that complexity breeds vulnerability. And so we see this trend, which is a worrisome trend, partly because of the availability of technology, partly because of the complexity of the protocols and partly because we’re paying attention and we’re trying to find ways to break these things so that we can harden our systems.

Unfortunately, this is only the tip of the iceberg because the bad guys are doing the same thing and we don’t know of the research they’re doing.

So when they find something we may not know about it, but this shows the trend. And I think you’ll notice that this trend bears out in the historical story that we tell. We have some data points from early on around the pre- and post-World War II era. And then we have increasing numbers of events that are important to this timeline in recent years because the technology has begun to propagate through the ecosystem and really take over our lives.

So those are some of the issues that we have that make wireless a problem: the ubiquity of devices and signals, the invisibility of those signals and the vulnerability of them to exploitation.

So at this point, I think we’re ready to jump into the section of our slides, which are a collection of capabilities that are a bit more advanced, maybe specific types of threats that are of concern.

So whereas before we talked about listening devices and the evolution of those capabilities, and then we touched on commoditized hardware that enables the propagation of the threats.

Now let’s talk about some specific threats and some stories associated with them.

Rodney, do you want to start us off with the NSO Group?

Yeah, so the NSO Group, a notorious group—I’ll simply say that it has great capabilities in the offensive cyber perspective—built a software package called Pegasus that could be installed on your cell phone.

And, you know, this capability was really, for better or worse, was focused around government’s ability to collect information on their citizens.

But then eventually became available. It was sold to other governments across the globe to be able to, quite frankly, spy on individuals.

And so NSO builds this baseline capability. They are able to exploit modern-day cell phone technology. They are able to take control essentially of your cell phone. When I say take control, take control of the ability to remotely capture video, audio, to exploit data that may be on your cell phone, or even to be able to exploit applications and what they may have access to. So, that’s a chat application or that’s access to banking information, or even sensitive medical information.

Once they gain control over your cell phone, whatever the applications that you had on your cell phone and whatever reason you were using them for, now becomes susceptible to the Pegasus software platform to exploit that application and gain access to the data and to use that data for nefarious reasons as we’ve seen highlighted across the globe.

And so it wasn’t just constrained to, you know, hey, I’m looking for—some would argue, I’m looking for terrorists inside of my country. Unfortunately, we’ve seen the Pegasus package used to, quite frankly, spy on government leaders across the globe. And, you know, some of the highlights of that turned into the president of France, the king of Morocco. There were reports of concerns with the government phones within Germany and elsewhere that were hacked.

Information was obtained by, as you see here, rival nations or nation-state actors looking to gain insight to the intentions of these national leaders, or access to sensitive information, or sometimes simply to gain access to information that could be embarrassing or compromising to these individuals.

Highly sophisticated capability, highly sophisticated technology that became fairly widely available.

And as you’ve seen has compromised upwards—and I would say dramatically more than—fifty thousand compromised devices across the globe.

There are many who continue to be concerned about the existence of Pegasus and its impact on society as a whole that’s out there today.

So Brett, back to you on this one. You might want to elaborate further beyond what I’ve shared.

Yeah, just a couple of things, Rodney. One, I totally agree with your comment about the fifty thousand. That’s just what we know. And that comes back to my—the thing I keep hitting on that what we know is only ever the tip of the iceberg. So there’s always more going on. And I’m sure we’re in the hundreds of thousands, if not millions, at this point.

One other thing I want to point out about the capabilities of this tool is that not only can you access all of the resources and memory and applications, you can access the hardware on the device that’s been compromised.

So if an attacker wants to turn on your microphone or your camera in such a way that you as a user don’t even know that that’s happening, basically they can do that. They can turn your smartphone into a sophisticated listening device that they use to surveil you.

And this gets back to closing the loop on what we first talked about: surveillance devices enabled by technology. Now we have a capability to compromise technologies that’s in your hands and turn it into a surveillance device working against you.

Considering that, and then typically this has been constrained to nation-state customers, but recently there was an investigation done on an attack that was attributed to a Russian APT that showed capabilities that had been acquired from Pegasus specifically. There’s other spyware toolkits out there too, but that capability—some of what we call zero-click attacks, which means you can dump a payload onto a device and infect that device without the user doing anything. You don’t have to click on a link, it just happens.

So those capabilities now appear to be in the hands of an APT, and that points to the propagation of those capabilities to the broader hacker ecosystem.

So this is another concerning trend where you get this kind of compromised capability into the hands of more and more people.

And now I get a little more concerned about anybody’s smartphone potentially having been compromised.

And then it can become a surveillance device or it could be used as a launch point for another kind of an attack similar to the methodology of what we call the nearest neighbor attack, which we’ll talk about in just a moment.

So anyway, this whole story about spyware is a very concerning story in my mind.

Yeah, Brett. I couldn’t agree more. And listen, I think for our audience, you have to understand that your cell phone becomes an active espionage tool, whether that’s corporate espionage, whether that’s nation-state focused espionage, whether that’s criminal in nature—the device that we are all carrying with us today through the Pegasus software can now be exploited. And you’re spot on, Brett.

Think about a cell phone inside of a pharmaceutical company, where the microphone is turned on and they’re building the next multi-billion dollar pharmaceutical drug to solve whatever problem they’re focused on, that being exploited. Or think about conversations in C-suites of financial institutions, or think about that compromised cell phone inside of a data center, the nexus point of all of the globe’s data that’s going on. All of these things present an exploitation opportunity that’s difficult to control. The good news is there are solutions to identifying unauthorized cell phones or devices within these secure facilities or these sensitive locations.

And again, as I think Brett has alluded to, if there’s interest in having that conversation with what Bastille does, feel free to reach out to Bastille. We’ll talk more to you about that.

Absolutely. Well, Rodney, let’s go on to the next story. Tell us a little bit about this flying pineapple.

Well, I think this is just a natural evolution in the ingenuity of bad actors out there. So we talked earlier about the pineapple as a rogue access point. And so then you get to bad actors who say, why don’t I put a pineapple on a UAV or a drone and I can use that to access locations that I physically can’t get to.

In this case, the one that was highlighted was a financial services company where they landed a couple of drones on top of the building, one of those being a flying pineapple that was able to set up an access point up there to exfiltrate data or gain access to their Wi-Fi infrastructure, as I said earlier, their credentials. And so I think it goes to the ingenuity of bad actors and new capabilities that are coming online every day. You can buy a reasonably equipped drone for fifteen hundred dollars that you could, in this case, put a pineapple in almost any location in the world with ease.

I would add this doesn’t have to just be a flying pineapple. We’ve seen them mounted in vehicles. You can do all sorts of things. It doesn’t really matter what the medium is to transport it. But I think that the flying pineapple shows, again, the ingenuity of the bad actors to place these devices in places that they had historically not had physical access to. And so when you think about this, think of a twenty-story building, and if you knew the C-suite conference rooms are on the fifteenth story of that building, you could literally fly a UAV up there with a pineapple and use that as an opportunity to see if you can get somebody to connect to it, to steal their credentials, which then would provide an access point to gaining into their corporate enterprise infrastructure.

So that’s really the flying pineapple. And this is not theoretical. This happened. It was widely reported in 2023, and this is what’s been reported and what was captured. So as Brett’s alluded to, probably the tip of the iceberg, there’s probably been more of this happening than we all realize.

It shows the ease at which you can now bring two different technologies together to do something that I don’t know that a lot of people were historically thinking about. And that is putting a pineapple on top of a building as a wireless access point exfiltration capability.

Brett, back to you.

Yeah. The—it’s not nice—the interesting thing about this story is the ability to remove yourself as the attacker from the scene of the crime and deploy the attack hardware forward without compromising yourself. In the past, we’ve had examples where people conducted evil twin attacks and were apprehended during that process. So this is an interesting little innovation that says, I just need to put hardware up there to conduct this attack. And this particular one that was discovered, I don’t know if it’s the only one that’s happened, but it’s the one that was found and publicized.

This particular example, they were successful in penetrating the network of their target.

So again, as Rodney said, not theoretical and something that we should be concerned about.

Okay, another story that I imagine many of you are aware of is the Salt Typhoon attack on United States communications infrastructure.

This has been attributed to Chinese hackers and they were able to successfully infiltrate the network systems of these carriers and utilize that position to listen in on phone calls and steal other data such as text messages.

So the concern here is that this was publicized in 2024 and work has been done to try to discover the extent of the infiltration and eject the attackers.

The concern is that we probably haven’t been able to successfully do that even today.

The extent of the penetration was mind-boggling and work continues, but the complexity and I guess the extent of the communications networks that were infiltrated is so complex that trying to work through all of that to ensure that it’s clean is a behemoth project.

So there’s a distinct likelihood that those actors are still in our networks in the United States and that telecommunications across those networks could be compromised.

So that’s another reason to be concerned, I think, about the use of cell phones and implication to privacy and confidentiality is probably an illusion at this point. We should be concerned, I think, about the presence of these attackers in our networks and their ability to see our activity. And that should give us pause, I think, in terms of our usage of those technologies and where we take such devices and how we use them should be something we consider.

Rodney, any thoughts on this attack?

Yeah, I mean, Brett, this is clearly a nation-state surveillance program.

The compromise of the American telecommunications infrastructure and the fact that we’re eighteen months or so beyond what was publicly acknowledged and that we still are unable to determine if we’ve eradicated Salt Typhoon from our telecommunications infrastructure should be of concern and a continuing concern for everybody who’s listening in on this webinar today or for all Americans in general.

And in fact, Salt Typhoon prompted the US government to advise cell phone users to start using encrypted, end-to-end encrypted applications to protect or provide privacy to their communications.

So think about your chat services and the things that you’re chatting about with your family members or friends or work colleagues or whatever—ensuring that they’re encrypted end-to-end to avoid these hackers from being able to exploit what we’re generally talking about on a day-to-day basis. And so it’s massive in scale. It’s complex. Incredibly difficult to determine whether or not we are able to eradicate this from our complex telecommunications infrastructure that cuts across all of our telecom carriers. And so this discussion on Salt Typhoon, I suspect is going to go on for quite some time before we fully understand the extent of it.

But it really does demonstrate that in today’s world, the technology is evolving at such a pace that our infrastructure is continuously at risk, and we need to be able to deploy the sort of capabilities that both identify and interdict these sorts of activities when they start to occur.

Brett, back to you.

Good. Thanks, Rodney.

So our next story is what we call the nearest neighbor attack. This was kind of a fascinating attack that took place on a domestic target, an organization that was being targeted by a Russian APT, and the attackers were on the other side of the world, but were able to successfully penetrate the Wi-Fi network of their target.

And just really briefly, the way that worked was they were able to obtain some credentials by doing a password spray attack on their target’s public-facing services over the internet.

And having found those credentials, they were stymied by the use of MFA or multi-factor authentication on those services.

So they got a little creative and they investigated neighboring organizations of their primary target, and they were able to penetrate their networks. They did this with multiple organizations that work in close physical proximity to their target organization, penetrated those networks, moved laterally, found multiple dual-homed devices that had internet access as well as a wireless interface that they could appropriate and use in order to gain access to the Wi-Fi network of their target. So this was a bit creative, but actually no step of that chain was really all that sophisticated. Now that the Russians have kindly shown us how to do this attack, it’s pretty straightforward to replicate this kind of an approach. In other words, I can utilize my ability to compromise some device to launch a wireless attack on some target and I don’t have to be anywhere near.

So we’ve seen the evolution of pushing hardware towards the front to enable some wireless attack while we as the attacker stay comfortably in our cave.

But this is an evolution beyond that that says I don’t even need to put hardware out there. I just need to compromise one of the many wireless devices that happens to be close to where I want to attack.

And now I can do all kinds of wireless attacks from far away. And that could be a laptop. It could be a smartphone using something like what we talked about, the Pegasus and other spyware-type capabilities. I just need a compromise of one of the tens of billions of wireless devices in the world.

I need one that’s close to where I’m trying to get to and I can do a wireless attack from anywhere. So this trend is also very worrisome.

And what worries me the most I think is the fact that it isn’t actually complex. It took some creativity to come up with that chain in the first place. But now that I know it’s possible, we’re going to have repeat examples of this with different flavors where they conduct wireless attacks from very far away.

Yeah, Brett, I would agree that this is not technologically innovative in that context, but it shows the creativity of hackers.

And the reality is, as you’ve started this discussion today, we live in a world that’s fully connected with billions of devices. And so you think about an office building and you think about the floor above and below and all of those different devices in there. As you said, it could be a printer. It could be a thermostat on a wall. It could certainly be the cell phone that we’ve talked about ad nauseam. But all of those things present an access point to a hacker to gain unfettered access to your environment and then use that to exploit whatever information thereafter.

And so it is creative. I do agree. I think we’re going to see more of this.

And so being able to identify these sorts of activities happening out there are going to become increasingly challenging.

How do we know what active RF devices are inside of an office or home?

The reality today is I don’t know that a lot of people actually know what’s active inside those environments. People are walking in with smartphones, they’ve got smartwatches, they’ve got all sorts of other RF devices. And I said thermostats on walls to thermometers, to you name it, it’s all connected.

And if it’s not secure, it becomes an opportunity for a hacker to leverage that from, as you said, thousands of miles away to conduct their hacking operation.

Yeah, absolutely. The hyperconnectivity of our world is a boon and a curse. It’s making us more efficient and effective in many ways, but it’s also making it easier for bad actors to exploit. So that’s the nature of the world we live in, I think.

Alright.

Finally, I want to talk a little bit about AI in general and its application to cyber attacks, including wireless. That could be Wi-Fi, cellular, IoT, any number of things.

And the way that I see this playing out, so AI is not new, obviously. It’s been around for many decades, probably on a similar timeline for what we’ve talked about here today. Post-World War II, we began to see the beginnings of AI.

But it’s really taken off recently because of the advent of ChatGPT and other large language models.

And that’s made it so that AI capabilities are much more accessible to the average person.

And there’s a nice human-machine interface that while it has its bugs, does an amazing job of understanding language, interpreting language, and then utilizing the knowledge that it’s obtained from vast amounts of training data to respond in a way that is apparently intelligent. So what we’re seeing in the cyber world, there’s a number of ways that people try to use AI both offensively and defensively.

What I’m seeing I think most effective is things that are related to natural language exploits like phishing, but also the ability to tighten the loop on developments of exploits.

So the ability to interface with a machine that can reason on some level, has access to vast amounts of data, can help us quickly optimize attack chains and even provide some code as a starting point for developing some links in that chain. So I think what we’re seeing is an escalation in the timeline of the development of both offensive and defensive measures due to the deployment of AI technologies within these ecosystems. And that is evident in the wireless domain as well as in the wired domain, which we probably, if you’re into this, you read a lot about.

So this is a more recent trend, something that is similarly worrisome to other stories that we’ve told in the sense that this cat-and-mouse game that we’ve been engaged with for, well, from at least the World War II timeframe, starting with back-and-forth of espionage using technology—that cat-and-mouse game that we’re engaged in has accelerated.

And it’s something that we need to pay attention to. And as defenders, we should be considering how to use AI to accelerate our own loops to counter these new threats, as well as using AI similar to some of the ways that Bastille does with our analytics module, the use of AI and ML capabilities to analyze data that we see as we’re monitoring things in the airwaves, to identify aberrations, unhealthy behaviors that could be indicative of a new form of attack that maybe we don’t have a good way to measure heuristically because it hasn’t been seen before. So the use of AI, I think on both sides is an important element of the evolving story of wireless cybersecurity.

Yeah, Brett, I would add to that. I would say, listen, AI is 24/7, literally every second of the day.

It has an opportunity or can be optimized to look for those CVEs or threats inside your environment. Where historically this was done by humans and humans’ capacity are simply limited in what they can look at at any given time. However, the AI that we’re now seeing deployed has the capability to consume large volumes of data rapidly, continuously monitor that data, make assessments, and really take the timeline from offensive cyber operations that we used to measure in months to even years down to seconds and maybe even minutes. But really in the seconds, you can now deploy an offensive cyber operation to take advantage of a known vulnerability.

And as bad cyber actors are absolutely getting creative out there, but where they first go are the known vulnerabilities that are highlighted in all of these devices that Brett talked about in the beginning of this webinar, which are thousands of known CVEs that are out there.

And so if you can literally scan using AI technology 24/7 for all known existing CVEs, you’re going to find a lot of infrastructure that is at risk and vulnerable.

And so likewise from the defensive side, as Brett’s alluded to, defense has to play at the speed of offense or we’re simply going to lose. And so we’re seeing the world dramatically change because of AI and the technology that’s now available to run 24/7 and consume large volumes of data.

And so really excited to see what Bastille has been doing in this and the analytics side of it to be able to provide that unique insight to the RF spectrum that they’re monitoring, to be able to discern what threat vectors are coming with that and be able to alert our partners as to the challenges that we see out there.

So Brett, back to you.

Yeah. Thanks, Rodney. So that wraps up the story that we wanted to tell today. Again, there is more to the story and we’ll continue to talk about some of these threats that have been seen throughout the history of wireless technology.

If you’re interested in learning more, I’d encourage you to connect with us, ask us questions.

We’ve got a lot of insight into this world and we’re happy to share what we’ve learned.

At this point, I’ll turn it back to Justin to wrap us up.

Thanks so much, Rodney. Thank you, Brett. We have WIDs already in our facility. Is that sufficient? It was brought in to tackle Wi-Fi. Should we be worrying more about cell phones or Bluetooth devices? Which is the higher priority?

Let me just touch on the last part of that question and I’ll answer the rest of it. I’m not sure that it’s about what the higher priority is and how you define that. I think the concern is that if you have a gap in your security, then that will be what gets exploited.

So I would say it depends on what you mean by WIDs.

Wireless intrusion detection systems are useful. They’re good. They’re typically looking for things like devices trying to get in in an unauthorized fashion.

But they don’t look for everything that’s going on in the Wi-Fi world. So for example, they wouldn’t notice that someone fired up a hotspot and a client connected to that hotspot and data got exfiltrated over the cellular network.

So that would be an area of concern. You want to make sure that you’re looking for everything in the Wi-Fi world that could be compromising your data.

And then as it pertains to other protocols, every protocol presents a potential risk. Wi-Fi may be the most obviously impactful because it’s typically integrated with our networks so that the access of the Wi-Fi network could compromise our key data.

But Bluetooth can be similarly concerning in that the compromise of a Bluetooth interface could lead to a compromise of a device from which I can pivot to another protocol and touch the network directly. Depending on what you’re trying to protect, Bluetooth can be very dangerous because it can be the mechanism that exfiltrates audio and video data from whatever facility that you’re in. If you’re worried about secure facilities, sometimes just the words that we use as we speak to one another can be confidential, classified or whatever, and compromising that can compromise national security. So my advice would be look at the entire spectrum of wireless technologies and ensure that you bring visibility to all of it so that you don’t have security gaps that will end up being exploited.

Yeah, Brett, I would add to that, Justin, and say that if you have a first-generation hardware-based WIDs system that was only looking for Wi-Fi, you’re in a difficult position in the national security space because the threat vectors that Brett has alluded to, whether it’s Bluetooth or ZigBee or cellular or whatever, present all sorts of other threat vectors that you need to be able to continuously look for and more broadly scan the RF spectrum.

And so this is the challenge. I think we have seen organizations that had invested in legacy WIDs technology that was hardware-based focused really on Wi-Fi only.

And that’s just not suitable in protecting our facilities today in the environment that we’re living in with all the threats that we’ve discussed today.

Rodney, Brett, thank you so much for all the time that went into this presentation, and thank you to the attendees. We’ll have future webinars on similar subjects at Bastille, so we look forward to inviting you to those. But for now, thank you all very much. See you soon.