Author: Joseph Salazar

Critical AirPlay Vulnerabilities Discovered

What You Need to Know About Apple’s Latest Security Update

Apple has released crucial security updates to address multiple vulnerabilities in AirPlay, the company’s widely used wireless media-sharing protocol. The Oligo Security research team identified these vulnerabilities, which pose significant risks, including denial-of-service (DoS) attacks and Remote Code Execution (RCE), which could allow attackers to gain unauthorized control over devices.

Understanding the Impact

The discovered vulnerabilities impact a broad range of Apple platforms, including:

  • macOS (MacBooks, iMacs, and Mac Mini)
  • iOS (iPhones)
  • iPadOS (iPads)
  • watchOS (Apple Watch)
  • tvOS (Apple TV)
  • visionOS (Apple Vision Pro)

Severity of the Exploit

Oligo uncovered five critical vulnerabilities, each targeting different aspects of AirPlay’s communication and memory-handling mechanisms. These flaws could allow attackers to:

  • Take complete control of affected devices – Attackers could execute arbitrary code remotely, allowing them to manipulate or exfiltrate user data.
  • Repeatedly crash the AirPlay service – Disrupting media streaming or device functionality through DoS attacks.
  • Execute malicious code remotely – Threat actors could send specially crafted packets over the network to trigger a system compromise.
  • Corrupt process memory – Leading to unstable system behavior, potential data leaks, or full system crashes.

Technical Breakdown: The Identified Vulnerabilities

Apple has assigned the following CVE identifiers to the vulnerabilities, highlighting their severity:

  • CVE-2025-24126Input Validation Flaw: Improper input validation within AirPlay could allow malicious packets to cause system termination or memory corruption.
  • CVE-2025-24129Type Confusion Vulnerability: Attackers on the same network could exploit this issue to crash applications or execute arbitrary code remotely.
  • CVE-2025-24131Memory Handling Weakness: A denial-of-service (DoS) vulnerability that attackers in privileged network locations could trigger.
  • CVE-2025-24177Null Pointer Dereference: Sending malformed AirPlay requests could cause devices to crash repeatedly.
  • CVE-2025-24137Remote Code Execution (RCE) via Type Confusion: This critical flaw could allow attackers to gain persistent remote access to the device.

Mitigation: How to Protect Your Devices

Given the severity of these vulnerabilities, users should take immediate action to secure devices and networks:

  • Install Apple’s Latest Security Updates – Ensure all iPhones, iPads, Macs, Apple TVs, Watches, and Vision Pro devices are on the latest OS versions.
  • Disable AirPlay (if unnecessary) – Users who do not frequently use AirPlay should turn off the AirPlay Receiver function to reduce exposure.
  • Restrict Network Access – Configure firewalls to limit AirPlay communication (Port 7000) to trusted devices only.
  • Tighten AirPlay Access Controls – Change AirPlay settings to “Current User Only” to prevent unauthorized connections.

Beyond Patching: The Need for Wireless Threat Detection

While Apple’s patches address these vulnerabilities, they highlight a broader issue: wireless attack vectors remain a critical security blind spot. Organizations cannot rely solely on patching because:

  • Zero-Day Threats Are Increasing – Attackers exploit unknown weaknesses before patches become available.
  • Wireless Attacks Are Hard to Detect – Traditional security tools cannot see RF-based threats in the environment.
  • Unpatched & Unpatchable Devices Exist – Some enterprise environments cannot update all devices immediately, leaving security gaps.

How Bastille Helps Organizations Secure Their Wireless Airspace

Bastille’s Wireless Airspace Defense platform provides continuous, real-time RF monitoring to detect and respond to anomalous wireless activity, even when attackers exploit unknown vulnerabilities. By analyzing radio frequency (RF) transmissions across 25 MHz to 7.125 GHz, Bastille can:

  • Detect Unauthorized Wireless Signals – Identify rogue devices attempting to exploit AirPlay and other wireless vulnerabilities.
  • Monitor for AirPlay Exploits – Alert security teams if suspicious AirPlay transmissions occur in the environment.
  • Identify and Track Wireless Threats – Locate and mitigate unauthorized RF-based attacks targeting corporate networks.

Final Thoughts

The newly discovered AirPlay vulnerabilities reinforce the importance of proactive wireless security. Organizations must move beyond traditional network defenses and adopt RF-based threat detection to safeguard against attacks leveraging unpatched wireless vulnerabilities. By integrating Bastille’s Wireless Airspace Defense, enterprises can gain complete visibility into wireless threats in their environment, ensuring their networks remain secure even when vulnerabilities emerge in widely used protocols like AirPlay.

AMA with Brian Contos and Brett Walkenhorst (Bastille) on the Nearest Neighbor Attack


On December 17, 2024, Brian Contos spoke with Brett Walkenhorst, Bastille Networks’s Chief Technology Officer, recording a quick Ask Me Anything video about the recent wireless attack that Veloxity disclosed.

The conversation explores the “Nearest Neighbor Attack,” an innovative wireless attack strategy highlighting how attackers bypass traditional proximity-based security assumptions. It delves into the attack’s mechanics and implications and discusses how Bastille Networks’ solutions address these challenges.

Volexity states, “The Nearest Neighbor Attack effectively amounts to a close access operation, but the risk of being physically identified or detained has been removed. This attack has all the benefits of being in close physical proximity to the target while allowing the operator to be thousands of miles away.”

The Nearest Neighbor Attack exemplifies the ingenuity and persistence of modern cyber adversaries. It underscores the need for comprehensive wireless security solutions like Bastille Networks, which provide visibility, detection, and actionable responses to mitigate these evolving threats. By integrating seamlessly with existing systems, Bastille addresses critical gaps in wireless security and helps organizations stay ahead of attackers.

Watch the video to hear the full discussion.

Samsung Employee Indicted for Stealing $180 Million in Intellectual Property Using Phone Camera, Seoul Prosecutors Claim

A recent industrial espionage case in South Korea highlights how insider threats can leverage physical and wireless vulnerabilities to exfiltrate highly sensitive intellectual property. The incident, which South Korean prosecutors value at over $180 million in damages, demonstrates why organizations need comprehensive visibility into all potential data exfiltration channels, including personal cell phones.

The Incident

The Seoul Eastern District Prosecutors’ Office indicted a former Samsung Display researcher for allegedly stealing trade secrets related to automated factory operations and leaking them to a Chinese competitor. The researcher, who lived in China for Samsung Display, is accused of photographing at least 17 key documents for Samsung’s Digital Display IP and transmitting them directly to Chinese firm employees between November 2021 and May 2022.

The Security Gaps

This case exposes several critical vulnerabilities that many organizations still struggle to address:

  1. Unauthorized Data Transmission: The suspect photographed and transmitted sensitive data directly to external parties without detection, using their mobile device, thus bypassing traditional network monitoring.
  2. Physical-Digital Convergence: The attacker exploited the gap between physical security controls and digital security monitoring by photographing confidential information and wirelessly transmitting it.
  3. Prolonged Exfiltration: The continuous data transmission over several months suggests a capability gap to detect anomalous wireless activity within secure areas.

The Impact

Prosecutors estimate the economic damage at 241.2 billion won (approximately $180 million), and experts suggest the technological gap created by this leak represents about ten years of R&D advantage. More concerning, during a May 2024 search of the employee’s residence, investigators discovered additional trade secrets beyond the 17 photographs that earlier investigations had missed.

Key Lessons for CISOs

This incident underscores why modern security programs must:

  • Monitor all potential data exfiltration vulnerabilities, including the proximity of personal phones to restricted areas with sensitive information. 
  • Maintain continuous visibility into wireless device activity within sensitive areas.
  • Deploy solutions that can detect anomalous wireless transmissions in real-time.
  • Correlate physical and digital security data for more effective threat detection.

The ability to detect and prevent wireless data exfiltration is no longer optional – it’s a critical requirement for protecting intellectual property in today’s threat landscape. Organizations must ensure complete visibility into their wireless airspace to identify potential insider threats before critical data leaves the building.

FBI and NSA warn of three new wireless attack vectors already exploited in the wild

In a joint cybersecurity advisory released October 10th, 2024, the FBI, NSA, UK NCSC, and other Western intelligence agencies warned that Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) continues to successfully breach private sector and government networks worldwide using a combination of traditional network attacks and concerning new wireless intrusion techniques.

The Wireless Vulnerabilities

The advisory highlights 24 specific vulnerabilities that network defenders should remediate to protect themselves against active exploitation from SVR (also known as APT-29, Midnight Blizzard, and Cozy Bear). While many of the highlighted CVEs target traditional network infrastructure like Microsoft Exchange Server and Apache, three vulnerabilities specifically enable wireless attacks that can compromise devices without requiring direct network access:

1. The agencies highlight CVE-2023-24023, a vulnerability in Bluetooth pairing that allows attackers within wireless range to conduct man-in-the-middle attacks, downgrade encryption, and potentially intercept or inject communications between Bluetooth devices.

2. The alert also suggests the SVR is exploiting CVE-2023-45866, a vulnerability that lets attackers within proximity of Bluetooth keyboards inject keystrokes and execute arbitrary commands on the connected computer – essentially giving them remote control of the machine through its wireless peripherals.

3. Third, and perhaps most concerning, is CVE-2023-40088, which enables remote code execution on Android devices through a “proximal/adjacent” Bluetooth attack without requiring any user interaction. This vulnerability means attackers only need to launch attacks from wireless transmitting devices within range of their target, not necessarily connected to the target’s network.

Attacker Strategy

The intelligence agencies note that SVR hackers are performing both targeted and opportunistic compromises of organizations by combining exploitation of traditional tactics like password spraying, supply chain compromise, and cloud account takeover with newer tactics. This hybrid approach lets them breach networks through conventional means and exploit wireless devices. The most concerning is how threat actors could hybridize these attacks – all of APT-29’s other profiled tactics are remote. As another Russian state-affiliated actor, APT-28, has shown with their Nearest Neighbor Attack, attackers thousands of miles away and outside an organization’s network security perimeter can control those devices launching wireless attacks remotely. Investigators found APT-28 remotely compromised the networks of nearby buildings and then launched wireless attacks from the devices on those neighboring networks. The alert does not specify that this is what APT-29 is doing. However, a joint cybersecurity advisory telling organizations around the globe to patch three separate proximal/adjacent wireless attack vectors suggests APT-29 can exploit these wireless attacks at scale.

“This activity is a global threat to the government and private sectors and requires thorough review of security controls, including prioritizing patches and keeping software up to date,” said Dave Luber, NSA’s Cybersecurity Director. The advisory states that SVR has “consistently targeted US, European, and global entities in the defense, technology, and finance sectors.”

The agencies strongly recommend organizations patch these vulnerabilities immediately, implement multi-factor authentication wherever possible, audit cloud accounts regularly, and, notably, “baseline authorized devices and apply additional scrutiny to systems accessing network resources that do not adhere to the baseline.” This recommendation suggests organizations need better visibility into what wireless devices are actually present in their facilities, not just what’s officially connected to their networks.

Why Wireless Airspace Defence

In the alert, the authoring agencies “recommend testing your existing security controls to assess how they perform against the techniques described in this advisory,” three of which are wireless attack techniques. 

Intelligence agencies have recently started highlighting other Russian hacking groups exploiting wireless vulnerabilities. In June 2024, the Health Sector Cybersecurity Coordination Center (HC3) of the Department of Health and Human Services released a cyber advisory on the Qilin Ransomware Group, which listed MITRE ATT&CK “T1011.001 – Exfiltration Over Other Network” as one of its tactics. Cybersecurity firm Volexity reported on the Nearest Neighbor Attack mentioned above in November 2024.

How To Protect Your Wireless Airspace

Organizations should review the full advisory for a complete list of vulnerabilities and detailed mitigation guidance. The key takeaway is that network defenders can no longer focus solely on protecting network perimeters – they must also actively monitor and secure the wireless airspace around their facilities, as sophisticated adversaries are increasingly exploiting these invisible attack vectors.

Contact Bastille today to learn how your organization can protect against these and other wireless vulnerabilities.

 NSA Issues Updated Guidance on Russian SVR Cyber Operations > National Security Agency/Central Security Service > Press Release View 
 Russian APT’s “Nearest Neighbor Attack” Reveals Critical Security Gap: An Organization’s Wireless Airspace – Bastille
https://media.defense.gov/2024/Oct/09/2003562611/-1/-1/0/CSA-UPDATE-ON-SVR-CYBER-OPS.PDF

Pakistani State Actors Compromised Indian Gov with Hak5 Wireless Pentesting Tools — Russia Remotely Hijacked Them

Joint reports from Microsoft Threat Intelligence and Black Lotus Labs disclose details of a years-long hacking campaign by the Russian FSB-linked group Secret Blizzard. Through a sophisticated multi-stage campaign, the group successfully compromised and repurposed Pakistani cyber operations infrastructure in Afghanistan and Indian networks, through a sophisticated multi-stage campaign.

The Heart of The Investigation: Hardware Hack

While tracking the activity of Pakistani state-affiliated group “Storm-0156”, Black Lotus Labs researchers discovered a C2 server designed to control a suite of deployed Hak5 commercial pen-testing devices remotely. Hak5 sells a variety of disguised penetration testing implant tools that rely on wireless or physical device access to compromise a target. Many of these tools have independent wireless antennas that allow remote C2 control via Hak5 software. Researchers observed Storm-0156’s server (with Hak5’s Commercial C2 Software Banner) with incredibly high data flow from several targets, including the Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs office in Europe, an Indian national defense organization, and several other government bodies. This activity suggests that Storm-0156 had deployed Hak5 implants on these networks. Black Lotus Labs researchers assume that the group chose Hak5 devices because of the advantage of this attack vector: these wireless and close-access attacks bypass standard EDR/XDR protections. 

The Russian Takeover

What came next was surprising: Every Storm-0156 C2 node used in this operation began communicating with 3 VPS IPs associated with the Russian FSB-linked group “Secret Blizzard” (also known as Turla). As the investigation of Storm-0156’s campaigns progressed, researchers discovered Russia’s Secret Blizzard had compromised 33 command-and-control server nodes used for their Indian and Afghanistan cyber operations campaigns.

Expansion of Operations

The Russian actors didn’t stop at simply monitoring Pakistani operations. By mid-2023, they had:

  • Infiltrated Pakistani operators’ workstations
  • Deployed their custom malware (“TwoDash” and “Statuezy”) into the networks of the Afghan Government Ministry and Intelligence Agencies
  • Acquired control of additional hacking tools used by other threat actors, including “Waiscot” and “CrimsonRAT”
  • Began retargeting Indian networks compromised by Storm-0156

Impact:

While current reports do not disclose further details on Secret Blizzard’s recent campaigns, they already highlight some key strategic implications.

Until the recent Nearest Neighbor Attack alerted the world to the reality of remote wireless attacks, cybersecurity professionals had discounted their organization’s wireless and cyber-physical vulnerabilities. Despite these attacks having many inherent advantages in avoiding EDR/XDR detection, organizations tolerated an increasing debt of wireless and cyber-physical vulnerabilities because they assumed attackers needed “Close Access” to exploit them. The events of 2024 have made clear, however, that attackers are actively leveraging an organization’s lack of wireless airspace visibility in their attack strategy. In the past 6 months, reports on Qilin group, APT-28, APT-29, and Storm-0156 have profiled their use of wireless attack vectors in cyber operations. As we see from the compromised C2 server in this attack, or APT-28’s Nearest Neighbor Attack, attackers can exploit these wireless vulnerabilities remotely.

How Bastille Can Help:

Bastille Networks’ Wireless Airspace Defense would 

  • Immediately identify the location and anomalous connections of any Hak5 wireless device.
  • Implement continuous wireless monitoring to detect unauthorized devices and connections
  • Detect and locate all other wireless implants in real-time
  • Create alerts for anomalous wireless behavior that could indicate compromised infrastructure
  • Maintain comprehensive wireless device inventory

Now, more than ever, the ability to detect, locate, and raise alerts on unauthorized wireless devices and connections is a critical security requirement as adversaries increasingly leverage wireless attack methods to bypass traditional defenses.

FBI warns of broad and ongoing Salt Typhoon Telecom Breach

Americans should stop unencrypted texting on their iPhones or Androids

Executive Summary

A confluence of troubling developments has emerged as U.S. officials reveal that Chinese state hackers remain deeply embedded in telecommunications systems. Meanwhile, due to the ongoing breach, the FBI and CISA have taken the unprecedented step of warning Americans to abandon standard text and voice messaging in favor of encrypted communications. This move represents a fundamental shift in how organizations approach personal and corporate wireless device security.

The Ongoing Breach

The Salt Typhoon breach of most U.S. telecommunications providers, initially disclosed to have targeted the presidential campaigns of both Donald Trump and Kamala Harris, now appears to be just a part of an ongoing “broad and significant cyber espionage campaign,” according to CISA Executive Assistant Director Jeff Greene.  Greene confirmed the telecommunications compromise is “ongoing and likely larger in scale than previously understood.” “We cannot say with certainty that the adversary has been evicted because we still don’t know the scope of what they’re doing,” said Greene. Senior FBI officials believe the investigation timeline to uncover Salt Typhoon’s full presence in these systems will be “measured in years.”

So far, the investigation has confirmed that attackers  gained access to:

  • Individual voice call audio and text message content
  • Bulk customer call metadata and communication patterns
  • Law enforcement surveillance request data

FBI warns Americans to stop sending texts

In light of the ongoing breach, CISA and FBI officials have urged Americans to “use encrypted apps for all their communications.” In the press briefing, Greene added, “Our suggestion, what we have told folks internally, is not new here: encryption is your friend, whether it’s on text messaging or if you have the capacity to use encrypted voice communication. Even if the adversary is able to intercept the data, if it is encrypted, it will make it impossible.”

Enterprise IP Targeted

Following Tuesday’s media briefing, Anne Neuberger, the U.S. deputy national security adviser for cyber and emerging technologies, addressed reporters on Wednesday, stating they now believe that Chinese-state affiliated actors had, in addition to targeting people of political interest to the Chinese government, targeted key enterprise IP. “We believe this is intended as a Chinese espionage program focused, again, on key government officials, key corporate IP, so that will determine which telecoms were often targeted, and how many were compromised as well.” In the same address, Neuberger reiterated that Chinese-state affiliated actors are still in U.S. telecom networks and stated the breach has likely persisted for the last 1-2 years. Neuberger also revealed that officials now believe these attacks have impacted the telecommunications providers of multiple countries in the EU and the Indo-Pacific region, in addition to at least eight telco providers in the U.S.

Enterprise Impact Assessment

U.S. official’s broad warning of this breach’s potential impact on Americans exposes a critical enterprise security gap that demands immediate attention:

It doesn’t matter if it’s a personal or enterprise-controlled device. Smartphones record an incredible variety of information from their environment and transmit it over networks your organization does not control.

Organizations should establish policies to prevent personal or enterprise cell phones from being near sensitive information that could be (unknowingly) exfiltrated via the device’s voice, camera, or messaging capabilities.

  1. Communication Security Organizations must reevaluate their wireless communication security, particularly:
  • Executive communications protocols
  • Sensitive business discussions
  • Cross-border communications
  1. Threat Detection Capabilities Traditional network monitoring may miss wireless-based threats, necessitating:
  • Continuous wireless spectrum monitoring for real-time, precise wireless device location reporting integration into existing SIEM and physical security systems to enforce device policy near sensitive locations
  • Real-time anomaly detection
  • Enhanced visibility into wireless device behavior

Strategic Implications 

“We need to do some hard thinking long-term on what this means and how we’re going to secure our networks,” acknowledged CISA officials. This crisis represents more than just another data breach – it demonstrates fundamental vulnerabilities in how modern enterprises communicate.

The combination of compromised carrier networks and inherently insecure messaging platforms creates an urgent need for organizations to implement comprehensive wireless security monitoring. Without the ability to detect anomalous cellular activity, device presence, unauthorized connections, and potential compromises, enterprises remain blind to sophisticated attacks that bypass traditional security controls.

How Bastille Can Solve This Problem

Bastille Networks’ Wireless Airspace Defense Sensor Arrays allow organizations real-time visibility and anomaly reporting into the wireless devices transmitting in their environment. 

Bastille integrates into your existing SIEM solution and provides complete visibility alerting for:

  • Unauthorized cellular devices that could be exfiltrating sensitive information
  • Rogue access points that could intercept wireless traffic
  • Bluetooth connections that could create unauthorized data channels
  • Malicious wireless connections to your network infrastructure, like those seen with the recent APT28 Nearest-Neighbor attack

Contact Bastille today to learn how your organization can secure the vulnerabilities in your wireless airspace attack surface.

Russian APT’s “Nearest Neighbor Attack” Reveals Critical Security Gap: An Organization’s Wireless Airspace

“Your network perimeter probably just got a bit wider.”

Brian Krebs, KrebsOnSecurity.com, November 23rd, 2024

A groundbreaking investigation released November 22, 2024, by Volexity details an alarming new attack vector dubbed the “Nearest Neighbor Attack.” This sophisticated technique allowed Russian state-sponsored attackers to breach a highly fortified target’s network, not by targeting it directly, but by taking control of the wireless networking devices of adjacent companies in buildings within the transmitting range of their target.

The Attack Timeline 

In February 2022, just before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Volexity detected suspicious activity on a customer’s server (which the report referred to as Organization A) that would lead to one of their most fascinating investigations. The Russian APT group GruesomeLarch (APT28/Fancy Bear) had successfully infiltrated their target using a multi-stage attack that exploited fundamental weaknesses in how wireless networks operate:

Initial Compromise:

  • The attackers first conducted password-spray attacks against Organization A’s public-facing web service platform to validate stolen credentials.
  • While they could not use these credentials for remote access due to MFA requirements, the organization’s Wi-Fi network only required username/password authentication.
  • This authentication setting created a critical security gap – but one the attackers couldn’t directly exploit from overseas.

The Neighbor Pivot:

  • To bridge the physical distance gap, the attackers first compromised Organization B across the street from their target.
  • Within Organization B’s network, they searched for and found systems with both wired ethernet and wireless network capabilities.
  • Using these dual-homed systems, they could scan for and connect to nearby wireless networks using the credentials from Organization A they had validated on the web service platform. 
  • These systems gave them direct access to Organization A’s internal network, bypassing external security controls.

Maintaining Persistence:

  • When the attackers lost initial access, they pivoted, compromising another nearby business, Organization C.
  • They used Organization C’s systems to regain wireless access to Organization B and, ultimately, Organization A.
  • Even after remediation efforts, they attempted another way into Organization A through the guest Wi-Fi network, which lacked proper segmentation from the corporate network.
  • The attackers used the Windows Netsh utility to create port forwards, allowing them to pivot from guest wireless to internal systems.

Why This Attack Matters 

This incident exposes a fundamental reality about wireless security that many organizations still need to grasp fully: firewalls and IDS/IPS are insufficient. A network is exposed to the vulnerabilities of all the devices within its wireless airspace, whether or not the organization controls those assets. While companies have invested heavily in securing their internet-facing assets against outside attacks – in this case, credentials and MFA security – attackers can trivially take control of any nearby wireless antenna to exploit the wireless vulnerabilities inside a protected network. GruesomeLarch managed to breach the networks of several organizations surrounding its target and launched different attacks against the target’s vulnerable wireless system.

This attack highlights a considerable security gap existing security controls struggle to bridge: attackers can leverage Wi-Fi and Bluetooth vulnerabilities affecting billions of devices globally to target hundreds of exposed and un-agentable IoT and wireless networking devices within a facility, compromising the organization’s security.

The Wireless Security Gap 

Traditional security tools and practices have a massive blind spot when it comes to wireless threats:

  • Perimeter firewalls and IDS/IPS can’t prevent attacks originating from within the network.
  • Network monitoring tools typically see only devices connected to corporate networks, not those in the airspace, poised to attack.
  • Endpoint protection often won’t detect nearby unauthorized wireless devices and can’t protect the hundreds of un-agentable IoT and networking devices inside a protected network.
  • Physical security can’t stop radio signals from reaching neighboring buildings.
  • Wi-Fi security tools focus solely on Wi-Fi, missing other wireless protocols that attackers could exploit.

How Bastille Could Have Prevented This Attack 

Bastille’s Wireless Airspace Defense platform uniquely positions itself to detect and prevent these sophisticated wireless attacks through:

  • Complete Wireless Visibility:
    • Continuously monitors protocols across the radio frequency spectrum commonly used for corporate wireless communications, between 100 MHz to 6 GHz
    • Detects ALL wireless devices and connections in the surrounding airspace in a 5000 sq. ft. radius per sensor, not just those devices on corporate networks
    • Alerts to any anomalous wireless connection within the airspace 
    • Provides visibility into Bluetooth, cellular, and other protocols beyond just Wi-Fi
  • Precise Physical Location Tracking:
    • Locates any transmitting device within 1-3 meter accuracy
    • Identifies wireless devices operating outside the authorized facility attempting to connect to network infrastructure
    • Maps wireless activity to physical spaces for contextual threat analysis and integrates into existing SIEM, XDR, and other tools for centralized reporting
    • Advanced Threat Detection:
      • Identifies new and unauthorized connections and other anomalous behavior
      • Alerts on suspicious device locations and connections
      • Real-Time Response:
        • Immediately alerts on wireless policy violations
        • Integrates with Wi-Fi controller to deny network access to unauthorized devices
        • Captures forensic data for incident investigation
        • Provides continuous monitoring to prevent attack recurrence

        Critical Recommendations 

        This recent attack demonstrates that wireless security requires a fundamental shift in approach. Organizations should:

        • Implement continuous monitoring of ALL wireless activity in their airspace
        • Consider physical proximity when assessing wireless security risks
        • Deploy solutions capable of detecting and locating unauthorized wireless activity
        • Treat wireless networks with the same security rigor as other remote access methods
        • Properly segment guest wireless networks from corporate resources
        • Monitor for unexpected wireless bridges between networks
        • Deploy solutions that can detect ALL wireless protocols, not just Wi-Fi

        The Next Evolution of Zero Trust 

        As organizations increasingly adopt Zero-Trust architectures to enhance their security posture, expanding their focus beyond traditional network perimeters becomes critical. A Zero-Trust approach cannot be fully effective if it overlooks the invisible and often unmonitored wireless landscape, which includes everything from Wi-Fi to Bluetooth, cellular, and other RF protocols. These wireless channels can be potential vectors for unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or lateral movement.

        Bastille addresses this significant blind spot by delivering comprehensive, 100% passive visibility into the entire wireless spectrum within an organization’s airspace. Its solution identifies and monitors every wireless device and connection – visible or hidden, authorized or unauthorized. This unparalleled capability enables organizations to detect and prevent potential wireless threats in real-time. It also ensures compliance with Zero-Trust principles by securing all possible attack surfaces, including those beyond traditional wired and endpoint defenses.

        By integrating Bastille’s technology, organizations gain the ability to enforce Zero-Trust policies within the wireless realm, ensuring a consistent and robust security framework that aligns with their overall cybersecurity strategy.

        Why handheld and point-solution detection equipment will fail DOD and Federal WIDS requirements

        INTRODUCTION TO DOD AND FEDERAL WIDS REQUIREMENTS

        DOD and Federal WIDS (Wireless Intrusion Detection System) requirements, such as those of the Secretary of Defense Memo of June 30th 2023 relating to the safeguarding of classified national security information (CNSI) from the threats posed by personal and portable electronic devices within SCIFs and SAPFs, cannot be met with handheld detection solutions for practical, technical, and regulatory reasons. Our breakdown explains the challenges in more detail:

        CHALLENGES IN MEETING DOD AND FEDERAL WIDS REQUIREMENTS WITH HANDHELD DETECTION EQUIPMENT

        COVERAGE AND DETECTION RANGE LIMITATIONS

        DOD and Federal WIDS require comprehensive network monitoring to detect unauthorized access points, rogue devices, and potential security threats. Handheld point solutions, due to their compact size and lower-sensitivity receivers, have limited detection ranges, making them inadequate for covering large areas or monitoring complex environments such as office buildings, airports, or military bases. Fixed WIDS sensors provide greater sensitivity for increased detection range and, when placed strategically around the building, provide more comprehensive coverage.

        CONTINUOUS MONITORING REQUIREMENTS

        Federal and DOD sites require 24/7 monitoring capabilities to ensure that any intrusion or security breach is detected in real time. Handheld devices, designed for portable, on-the-go use, are not built for continuous, unattended operation. This intermittent use can lead to gaps in coverage, allowing security incidents to go undetected.

        PROCESSING POWER AND REAL-TIME ANALYSIS CHALLENGES

        Meeting WIDS requirements requires real-time analysis of wireless traffic from cellular, Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, and IoT devices, which involves processing large volumes of data and running complex algorithms. Handheld devices typically lack the necessary processing power and resources compared to dedicated WIDS hardware, which are designed with robust processors and specialized software to handle these tasks efficiently.

        LACK OF WHITELISTING CAPABILITIES

        Due to their limited capabilities, handheld devices are incapable of maintaining lists of authorized devices. This is a crucial capability to accommodate exceptions for medical devices such as hearing aids, insulin pumps, and other authorized devices. The inability of handheld detectors to maintain such lists leads to alerts on every electronic device, false alarms, operator fatigue, and the security gaps that inevitably follow. A dedicated WIDS system with appropriate packet decoding and management software is necessary to meet these needs.

        COMPLIANCE AND AUDIT LOGGING DEFICIENCIES

        Federal and DOD requirements may require detailed logging and audit capabilities to track wireless activity and intrusion attempts. Handheld devices have limited storage capacity and lack the robust logging infrastructure for long-term data retention and compliance reporting. Dedicated WIDS systems are equipped with centralized logging servers and secure storage solutions to meet these requirements.

        ADVANCED THREAT DETECTION AND RESPONSE

        Meeting DOD and Federal WIDS requirements involves detecting advanced threats like protocol attacks, signal jamming, and spoofing. Handheld devices are generally designed for basic scanning and detection tasks and may not support the advanced analytical tools or response mechanisms necessary to counter sophisticated threats.

        REGULATORY COMPLIANCE AND CERTIFICATION CHALLENGES

        Handheld devices are consumer-grade or commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) products. They typically fail to meet stringent regulatory certifications like NIAP, making them unsuitable for regulated environments. They may also emit RF in order to detect wireless devices, rather than being a 100% RF passive solution as with some permanent WIDS solutions. This makes them unsuitable for monitoring secure facilities like SCIFs and SAPFs where active RF emissions are prohibited.

        INTEGRATION WITH EXISTING SECURITY INFRASTRUCTURE

        Federal and DOD WIDS requirements, like those in the Secretary of Defense Memo of June 30th, 2023, require integration with other security infrastructure systems, such as SIEM (Security Information and Event Management) systems, physical security control software, and automated response tools. Handheld devices are not designed to seamlessly integrate with these systems, limiting their effectiveness within a comprehensive security architecture.

        PRACTICAL LIMITATIONS OF LOBBY-BASED WIDS DEVICES

        GAPS IN SECURITY COVERAGE IN ENTRANCE AREAS

        Placing WIDS devices only in entrance areas leaves gaps in security coverage throughout the building. A common tactic to circumvent WIDS detection is for individuals to turn off their phones or other wireless devices before passing through monitored entry points, re-enabling them once inside. Without continuous, building-wide monitoring, unauthorized devices can operate undetected once past the initial checkpoint. Addressing this gap requires a comprehensive WIDS deployment with sensors distributed throughout the facility.

        MISSED DETECTIONS AND FALSE ALARMS

        Lobby-based systems are prone to miss detections due to the bursty nature of wireless protocols. But they are also prone to false alarms due to their inability to decode packets and identify individual devices. Such systems, operating based on power thresholds, are unable to distinguish between one device near the entrance to a secure space and many devices in the lobby or parking lot. This also prevents these systems from accommodating authorized device exceptions, leading to further false alarms. Such behavior limits the effectiveness of the system, often leading operators to ignore alerts or shut the system down. Deployment of such systems leads to a false sense of security, which ultimately weakens the organization’s security.

        CONCLUSION: THE NEED FOR DEDICATED WIDS SOLUTIONS

        Handheld and other point solutions for electronic device detection lack the technical capabilities, continuous monitoring features, processing power, compliance mechanisms, and integration options required to meet federal WIDS requirements. Environments that must adhere to these requirements need dedicated WIDS solutions with enterprise-grade hardware and software for comprehensive wireless security monitoring and compliance to counter the threat from bad actors.